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FARMLAND UTILIZATION AND CROPPING STRATEGIES
DURING A WORLD FOOD CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF RICE 
PRODUCERS IN THE LOWER SENEGAL RIVER VALLEY
Ryuta TAKAHASHI
Graduate School of Asian & African Area Studies (ASAFAS), Kyoto University
ABSTRACT  This study entailed an empirical investigation of farmland utilization and 
cropping strategies under conditions of a sharp increase, followed by a collapse, in rice prices.
The results are based on a fi eld survey conducted by the author in Village T in the Lower 
Senegal River Valley, the center of rice production in Senegal. This paper fi rst discusses the
exploitation and rehabilitation of farmland under conditions of increased rice prices, along
with agricultural programs of the Senegalese government. Increased rice prices and the
implementation of programs allowed villagers to reinforce a foundation for their livelihoods
through collective effort. Next, the paper describes farmland utilization and farming expenses
under conditions of price increases and collapse and demonstrates how the villagers use rice as
a subsistence crop and plant tomatoes as their main cash crop to ensure their own food secu-
rity. The results reveal that the villagers have planned several alternatives and apply these op-
tions under specifi c political, economic, or social conditions.
Key Words: Agricultural fi nance; Domestic production; Livelihood strategy; Rice; Senegal.
INTRODUCTION
International prices of major cereals (rice, wheat, and maize) increased sharply
from the end of 2007 to the middle of 2008. In African countries, where demand 
for rice and its import have expanded in recent years, increases in international
rice prices resulted in food insecurity. Surprisingly, international rice prices remain
nearly 50% higher than the 2007 average even though international maize and 
wheat prices have now returned to pre-spike levels (Childs & Kiawu, 2009; FAO,
2010). In addition, the price of imported rice in Africa’s domestic markets has
declined more slowly than that in the global market (FAO, 2009b). The high cost 
of rice in Africa’s domestic markets remains a matter of grave concern for vulne-
rable people who spend a large part of their incomes on food.
Rice is the main cereal consumed in Senegal(1), and the Senegalese faced a
particularly diffi cult situation. The price of imported rice in Dakar markets rose
from 220 F CFA(2) per kg in August 2007 to 469 F CFA per kg in September 
2008 (CSA, unpublished database). The price of imported rice has declined since
January 2009, but in July 2010, it was still 298 F CFA. The price increase hit the
Senegalese population hard, particularly urban residents who depend on imported 
rice for their daily diet.
Under these diffi cult conditions, the Senegalese government enforced two agri-
cultural programs: the Grand Agricultural Offensive for Food and Abundance (la
Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nouriture et l’Abondance: GOANA; Sénégal,
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2008)(3) and the National Program of Self-suffi ciency in Rice (Programme National
d’Autosuffi sance en Riz: PNAR; Sénégal, 2006; 2007)(4). The GOANA program
oversees special programs for agricultural products (e.g., cassava and groundnut)
and gives top priority to the PNAR program. A specifi c goal of GOANA and 
PNAR is to increase rice production, with strategic goals that are classifi ed into
fi ve principal categories: increasing rice cropping area by exploiting and rehabili-
tating rice-paddy fi elds and increasing nominal area by encouraging rice double
cropping; continued subsidy for fertilizers and agrichemicals; facilitation of fi nanc-
ing for rice production and necessary equipment; reinforcement of producers’
capacities through training; and facilitation of rice commercialization. International
aid agencies, including the World Bank and several countries, have invested large
sums to support these projects in the Senegal River Valley.
The price of paddy rice produced in the Lower Senegal River, the center of 
rice production in Senegal, rose at the end of 2007 in synchrony with the sharp
increases in the price of imported rice. One bag of paddy rice, which weighs
about 84.6 kg, was 8,000–10,000 F CFA before the rice price increase, but 10,500–
15,000 F CFA in 2008 (based on interviews with rice producers and private rice
merchants in the Lower Senegal River Valley). At the beginning of 2009, the
price of paddy rice dropped to 4,000 F CFA. Rice producers were hit hard because
they could not sell the harvested paddy rice to private merchants even if the
 producers agreed on a price of 4,000 F CFA(5).
African governments and international aid agencies have worked hard to
encourage food security and increased rice production in Africa(6). Many scholars
have used national or regional statistics to document the food insecurity and poor 
rice production in Africa. However, these analyses are unavoidably superfi cial
because they are based on data that are simply national or regional holistic
summations. For example, Bâ (2008) analyzed Senegal’s food security by  analyzing
food-grain production, agricultural policy, and international support for all of 
Senegal based on national and regional data. Thus, he failed to reveal the fact 
that Senegalese peasants do not place the highest priority on food security for 
the nation, but rather on their own food security and survival. What seems to be
lacking in this kind of analysis is the perspective of African peasants.
African peasants translate a set of assets (e.g., capital, land, or labor) into a
livelihood strategy composed of a portfolio of activities mediated by a number 
of contextual politic, economic, social, and natural considerations (Ellis, 2000).
Through this livelihood strategy, they can cope with their own food insecurity
and ensure their own food security (cf. Hosomi et al., 1996). These contextual
considerations vary, so peasants’ assets and access to assets vary; consequently,
their livelihoods and livelihood strategies differ. Therefore, it is important to accu-
mulate case studies about the diverse livelihoods of various African peasants.
This study entailed an empirical investigation of farmland utilization and crop-
ping strategies under conditions of a sharp increase, followed by a collapse, in
rice prices. This paper begins by outlining the research area, the Lower Senegal
River Valley and Village T. Next, it discusses the exploitation and the re- utilization
of farmland during the increased price of rice in 2008. Finally, it focuses on
farming expenses and cropping strategies under conditions of price increases and 
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collapse. The data used in this study were mainly gathered during fi eld surveys
conducted by the author in Village T over a period of about 24 months (August 
2004–February 2005, December 2006–February 2007, December 2008–January
2009, and July 2009–June 2010).
RESEARCH AREA AND PEASANT ORGANIZATION
Village T is an agglomerated settlement of Wolof people with 1,122  inhabitants
in 134 households (123 male and 11 female heads of household). This village is
located in the Lower Senegal River Valley and is administered by the Communauté
Rural de Ross-Bethio, Arrondissement de Ross-Bethio, Département de Dagana,
Région de St. Louis (Fig. 1). The Lower Senegal River Valley has three seasons:
a 3-month rainy season (late July–early October), a 4.5-month cold dry season (late
October–February), and a 4.5-month hot dry season (March–early July). Annual
rainfall in the town of Ross-Bethio, adjacent to Village T, ranged from 49 to 336 mm
from 1972 to 2003, with an average of 217 mm (SAED, unpublished data).  Peasants
in the Lower Senegal River Valley generally cultivate rice in the rainy and/or the
hot dry seasons, and tomato or onion in the cold dry season.
Although the area receives little rainfall, fl ooding of the Lower Senegal River 
and its tributaries has produced rich soil and has formed a fl oodplain and  alluvial
delta (Fig. 1). Since 1934, the colonial government and later the Senegalese
government worked to expand and improve irrigation systems for rice cultivation
Fig. 1. The Lower Senegal River Valley.
Source: SAED & Direction du Dévéloppement et de l’Aménagement Rural (DDAR) 2008. Les Amé-
nagements Hydro-Agricoles de la Délégation de Dagana: Classifi cation par Type, SAED & DDAR,
St. Louis.
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in the fl oodplain of the Senegal River and to implement measures for domestic
rice promotion. Consequently, the Senegal River Valley, particularly the Lower 
Senegal River Valley, has become the center of Senegal’s domestic rice  production
(SAED, 1998; Bonnardel, 1992). Tomato and onion crops have been widely
cultivated in the Senegal River Valley since the 1990s (SAED, 2005; 2006).
In Village T, a fl oodplain lies between the Senegal River and the national road.
The other side of the national road is an underproductive sandy plain that has
never been fertilized by fl ooding of the Senegal River or its tributaries. Village
households are allotted cultivation rights to farmland plots on the fl oodplain to
grow rice and tomatoes and plots on the sandy plain to grow tomatoes and other 
vegetables. Extended families are allotted rights to reclaim the uncultivated areas
of the fl oodplain.
Almost every household head with cultivation rights in Village T, including
female heads, is affi liated with the village’s Peasant Organization. The Peasant 
Organization is run by the villagers and includes 166 registered members(7). The
main reason the villagers instituted the organization, and the reason they register 
as members, was to access credit from the National Bank of Agricultural Credit 
of Senegal (Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal: CNCAS). CNCAS
only allocates funds to peasant organizations, not individual peasants. The  Peasant 
Organization chooses cropping seasons (including rice cropping in the rainy and/
or hot dry seasons and tomato cropping in the cold dry season) at a general
assembly, which all members may attend, and at a gathering of executives of the
Peasant Organization(8).
FARMLAND UTILIZATION IN VILLAGE T AFTER THE INCREASED PRICE
OF RICE
I. Exploitation of Farmland by the Peasant Organization of Village T
The price of paddy rice produced in the Lower Senegal River Valley increased 
along with international rice prices. This section evaluates how the sharp increase
in rice prices affected farmland utilization of fl oodplain fi elds in Village T. First,
it is important to provide an overview of the history of farmland exploitation and 
the allotment of cultivation rights in the village.
In 1980, a government development agency called the National Corporation of 
the Lands Development and Exploitation of the Senegal River Delta and the
Senegal River and the Faleme Valleys (Société Nationale d’Aménagement et 
d’Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Sénégal et des Vallées du Fleuve
Sénégal et de la Falémé: SAED) began large-scale exploitation and redistribution
of paddy fi elds on the eastern side of fl oodplain of Village T (Fig. 2). It installed 
a large pump to divert water from the Lampsar River, a tributary of the Senegal
River, to irrigation canals. SAED allotted cultivation rights for these exploited 
and redistributed plots to the household heads of Village T. During the next 20
years, other areas of paddy fi elds were not exploited. Young married men could 
not obtain any cultivation rights until they inherited it from their fathers.
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In 1999, the Peasant Organization worked to remove this restriction. The
organization created new farmland in the eastern fl oodplain and granted new
cultivation rights to young married men who previously had none. Additionally,
the Peasant Organization created and distributed new sandy-plain farmland in
2004 to grant cultivation rights for tomato production to young men. New  eastern
fl oodplain plots were allotted to 24 young married men, and new sandy-plain
plots were allotted to 57 young men.
The location of each plot was determined using a lottery system. The alloca-
tion process differed for eastern fl oodplain and sandy-plain plots: for new fl ood-
plain plots, only young men who had been allotted new cultivation rights drew
lots, whereas all members (those who previously had cultivation rights and those
with newly allotted cultivation rights) were permitted to draw lots for the tomato
cropping fi elds. Thus, the Peasant Organization re-allotted equal-acreage plots for 
all members.
In the same manner, in 2008, the Peasant Organization developed the western
side of the fl oodplain and granted new rice cultivation rights to the 57 young
men who had obtained cultivation rights for tomato cropping in 2004 (Fig. 2).
Although these young men had already been registered as members of the  Peasant 
Organization, which had provided them with credit for tomato cultivation, they
had neither fl oodplain cultivation rights nor credit for rice production. Therefore,
the Peasant Organization had decided to create new fl oodplain plots in western
uncultivated land and grant the new cultivation rights.
Fig. 2. Farmland Utilization in Village T.
Source: Field survey by the author (2004, 2006, 2008 & 2009).
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The 2008 project differed from the 1999 and 2004 projects in important ways:
while all of these development and allotment projects were initiated as a result 
of inequalities between the villagers with and those without cultivation rights, the
2008 project was backed by the GOANA and PNAR programs. One of the goals
of the GOANA and the PNAR programs is to increase rice-cropping acreage, so
the government made it easier for peasant organizations to access a loan for 
farmland exploitation or rehabilitation of irrigation facilities. The Peasant Orga-
nization in Village T had little diffi culty acquiring a loan.
Another important difference was the diesel pumps that the Indian government 
provided to support the GOANA and the PNAR programs. The villagers in  Village
T obtained four of these diesel lifting pumps in 2008 at no cost; they set up
these pumps along the Lampsar River and begun to irrigate the western  fl oodplain
plots. Previously, they had had to raise water using a few individually owned 
smaller pumps that were moved from one water-lifting point to another. The
Indian lifting pumps could raise much larger volumes of water and could irrigate
a wide section of western fl oodplain farmland more easily and reliably than was
previously possible.
The exploitation and allotment projects of the fl oodplain fi elds in 1999 and 
2008 and of the sandy plain in 2004 promoted an agricultural infrastructure and 
increased agricultural production capacity. The development of farmland and the
allotment of cultivation rights, backed by the GOANA and the PNAR programs,
could be considered bailout measures for young villagers with no cultivation rights
who had been the more vulnerable households. They could also be considered 
corrective measures against inequality between villagers with and without culti-
vation rights. They allowed the villagers to build a fi rmer foundation for their 
livelihoods through collective efforts.
II. Farmland Re-utilization by the Peasants in Village T
Another noteworthy effect of the increased price of paddy rice was farmland 
re-utilization in western fl oodplain plots by households or private peasant groups
other than the Peasant Organization in Village T. It is important to contextualize
this issue within the history of the western fl oodplain fi elds.
Other than the farmland plots that households have been given the right to
cultivate, extended families are permitted to reclaim land from the fl oodplain
fi elds in Village T. Some families formed private peasant groups to jointly take
part in reclamation and irrigation, but they usually abandoned those plots after 
cultivating rice or vegetables for several years. They said they were forced to
abandon their plots because they could not obtain credit from CNCAS; unlike
the Peasant Organization, their small peasant groups did not have access to these
funds. Therefore, they gradually began to concentrate on and depend on rice
cropping in eastern fl oodplain farmland because they needed to continue their 
costly farm management.
Despite a lack of credit, in 2008, western plots began to be re-cultivated pro-
perly as a response to the increases in international rice prices. Household heads
who had exploited the western fl oodplain plots and had obtained cultivation rights
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or who had inherited their fathers’ cultivation rights resumed managing their 
western farmland plots after long years of abandonment by using their own
resources rather than credit from CNCAS. One important aspect of the re- utilization
of western fl oodplain farmland is that it reinforced the holistic foundations of the
villagers’ livelihoods, as did the development and allotment projects.
However, the real issue lies a little deeper. First, it is useful to examine some
of the important features of the re-utilization within the context of the villagers’
experience of the canal expansion to the sandy-plain farmland.
While irrigation was established for the farmland across the delta fl oodplain,
the sandy-plain fi elds south of the national road were not irrigated because the
national paved road blocked the way (Fig. 1). Therefore, sandy-plain fi elds in the
Lower Senegal River could generally only be cultivated in the short 3-month
rainy season. However, in 2000, the Peasant Organization managed to expand the
canals to the sandy-plain fi elds by tunneling under the paved road. This canal
expansion allowed the Peasant Organization to further expand canals and exploit 
newly irrigated sandy-plain fi elds in 2004, as described above(9). Through this
canal expansion, the Peasant Organization initiated their own rural development 
project, creating cash-earning opportunities and stabilizing the village economy.
Canal expansion allowed the villagers to expand their cropping options. Their 
cropping schedules used to be tight because tomato was originally cultivated only
in the fl oodplain farmland, and only in the dry season when rice was not being
cultivated. The expansion of irrigation canals to the sandy-plain fi elds enabled 
the villagers to cultivate tomato crops in the sandy-plain farmland and thus to
choose farmland for tomato cropping from both the fl oodplain and the sandy
plain when developing their annual cropping schedule. For example, the Peasant 
Organization planned to seed tomato in fl oodplain farmland in 2006/07(10) after 
Table 1. Farmland Utilization from 2004/05 to 2009/10
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Floodplain ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ○ ▲ ○ ● ●
Western 
Floodplain — — — — — — — — — — — — ● ● ▲
Sandy plain ● ● ● ○ ●
Rice Producer Price Increase Rice Producer Price Collapse
Legends:
Rice RS: rice cropping in a rainy season Rice DS: rice cropping in a dry season
●: regularly cultivated farmland ▲: irregularly cultivated farmland
○: irregularly no-cultivated farmland —: farmland abandoned
Source: Field survey by the author (2004, 2006, 2008 & 2009).
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tomato cropping in the sandy plain twice, in 2004/05 and 2005/06 (Table 1). As
shown in Table 1, the villagers were able to juggle tomato cropping in the cold 
dry season and rice cropping in the hot dry season (although they could not 
 juggle these crops when they used fl oodplain farmland for tomato cropping, as
in 2006/07).
This example demonstrates how broadening their cropping options has allowed 
the villagers to create cash-earning opportunities and to stabilize the foundation of 
their livelihoods. The same may be said, no doubt, of the re-utilization  project in
western fl oodplain farmland in 2008. The villagers can now choose cropping
farmlands from among the eastern and the western fl oodplain farmland and the
sandy-plain farmland. In principle, they can choose what and where to plant in
three areas of farmland throughout the year and at least cultivate rice or tomato
during each season in one of the farmland fi elds. If they maximize all farmland 
plots, they can cultivate rice twice in the eastern fl oodplain farmland and twice in
the western fl oodplain farmland, and cultivate tomato once in the sandy plain.
CROPPING STRATEGIES UNDER CONDITIONS OF AN INCREASE,
FOLLOWED BY A COLLAPSE, IN RICE PRICES
As discussed in the previous section, the sharp increase in paddy-rice prices
allowed the villagers to allot cultivation rights to young men by developing the
western fl oodplain fi elds and to broaden their cropping options. This section
focuses on their farming expenses and strategies for rice and tomato production
after they expanded their cropping options following the increase in paddy-rice
prices in 2008 and the collapse at the beginning of 2009.
The Peasant Organization of Village T reaches a consensus about the cropping
schedule during the general assembly. Until 2007/08, members cultivated tomato
crops in the fl oodplain biyearly or triennially for purposes of land restoration and 
soil fertility regeneration (Table 1). According to their agreed-upon annual  cropping
schedule, they were to cultivate tomato crops in sandy-plain farmland in 2008/09.
In fact, they cultivated tomato crops in eastern fl oodplain farmland after only
one-time tomato cropping in the sandy plain in 2007/08. In 2009/10, even though
they were scheduled to cultivate tomato in the sandy plain, approximately half 
the members grew tomato in the western fl oodplain plots instead (Fig. 2). Thus,
they did not completely conform to their regular annual cropping schedule in
2008/09 and 2009/10.
Why did the villagers change their formalized annual cropping schedule in 2008/09
and why did half of them choose to plant in the western fl oodplain fi elds in 2009/10
against their agreed-upon cropping schedule? It may be said that the actual
cropping schedule was ineffi cient; in 2008/09 they could have cultivated rice in
eastern fl oodplain farmland in the rainy and dry seasons. In addition, they could 
have cultivated rice in western fl oodplain farmland after the tomato harvest if every
villager chose to cultivate tomato crops in the sandy-plain plots in 2009/10.
The principle reason why the villagers did not cultivate rice in the western
fl oodplain in 2009/10 was that the downward trend in paddy-rice prices dimi-
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nished their incentive to cultivate rice. Still, this does not explain why they did 
not cultivate rice in the eastern fl oodplain in 2008/09, but did in 2009/10. The
reasons may be found by examining their farming expenses and farmland utili-
zation for tomato cropping. Before beginning this analysis, it is important to
outline the credit system for rice and tomato production.
I. Credit System for Rice and Tomato Production
The National Bank of Agricultural Credit of Senegal (CNCAS) offers agri-
cultural credit to peasant organizations with a group-lending approach rather 
than to  individual peasants. The money is loaned to the peasant organizations
without any security, but members have a collective responsibility to repay all
debt. If a peasant organization has a low repayment rate, they will not be
granted further credit.
A peasant organization may apply for CNCAS credit based on agreement 
reached at its general assembly and executive meetings (Fig. 3). CNCAS deter-
mines whether the peasant organization will receive credit based on its past 
repayment rate. If approved, the amount of credit is calculated based on the total
acreage members plan to cultivate. A peasant organization may stock up on input 
goods from private dealers and distribute these goods to members. In the case
of rice production, during the rice harvest, the Peasant Organization in Village T
informs each peasant of the amount of credit to be paid back. The members
generally pay back the credit with paddy rice valued at 90 F CFA per kg. The
Peasant Organization then sells this paddy rice to private merchants to raise cash
and subsequently repays the CNCAS with this cash.
The credit system for tomato production differs from that for rice production. In
the case of tomato production, before applying for CNCAS credit, a peasant organi-
Fig. 3. Flow Chart of Credit and Repayment System.
Source: Field survey by the author.
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zation must sign a contract with Senegal Canned Food Company (Société de  Conserves
Alimentaires au Sénégal: SOCAS), the biggest whole-tomato  canning company in
Senegal (Fig. 3)(11). SOCAS reaches an agreement on the acreage for tomato  planting
with each peasant organization and agrees to purchase all  tomatoes harvested by that 
organization members. SOCAS now purchases all the tomatoes used in its cans of 
whole tomatoes from peasant organizations in the Lower and the Middle Senegal
River Valley through purchase contracts with these organizations.
However, individual members within a peasant organization are subject to a
level of risk. Each peasant organization has a bank account with CNCAS, and 





2009/10 Cold Dry Season
Tomato (n= 104) 
average=0.62 ha
F CFA/member % F CFA/member %
Gross Income** (A)  245,060 304,459
Input Cost (B=C+F)  502,310 100.0 303,015 100.0
Credit by CNCAS (C=D+E)  386,296 76.9 262,932  86.8
Credit for cultivation (D)  272,218 54.2 166,076  54.8
Plowing, Ridging   51,747 10.3  24,349   8.0
Seeds, Fertilzers, Agrichemicals  149,666 29.8 107,793  35.6
Energy for lifting pump   41,479  8.2  20,720   6.8
Others   13,070  2.6   3,538   1.2
Interest (6%)   16,296  3.2   9,676   3.2
Others (E) 114,078 22.7  96,856  32.0
Membership due    8,991  1.8   1,556   0.5
Irrigation tax   15,682  3.1   3,617   1.2
Amortization***   63,826 12.7   4,121   1.4
Arrear   25,579  5.1  87,562  28.9
Other Input Cost**** (F) 116,014 23.1  40,083  13.2
Employment   58,992  11.7  40,083  13.2
Husking or Combining*   45,485  9.1 — —
Transport  11,537  2.3 — —
Net Income (G=A−B) −257,250   1,444
Source: Field survey by the author (2009), Credit account ledger of Peasant Organization of Village
T (2009).
Note: *  With random sampling method, I withdrew 83 members of the Peasant Organization of 
Village T who cultivate rice-paddy for farming expenses survey in the rainy season, and 67
members of them who also cultivated tomato in the cold dry season. The random samples
for tomato farming expenses also include 31 members who did not cultivated rice-paddy in
the rainy season, and 6 female villagers of women’s groups.
  **  Gross income is converted from harvested paddy into cash at the rate of 4,000 F CFA per 
kilogram, the average price of producer price in 2009/10 on the assumption that the  samples
sell all harvested paddy. I calculated hire charges for the husking, combine, and transport,
which are paid in paddy in the same fashion. Gross income for tomato production is cal-
culated at 51.5F CFA/kg, the price contracted between SOCAS and peasant organizations.
 ***  Amortization is devoted to repayment of the loan which the Peasant Organization of  Village
T acquired for the development or readjustment of farmland.
****  Input cost here does not include cost depreciation.
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SOCAS pays its cash for tomatoes into this account. CNCAS deducts the amount 
of the credit, including any arrears, from these payments. A peasant organization,
therefore, receives money only when it is able to repay its entire debt; the  peasant 
organization withdraws any profi t and distributes it to members, but only after 
the repayment rate reaches 100%.
The CNCAS system is risky for members, but the credit is absolutely  necessary
for peasants; rice and tomato production are both very expensive. For members
of the Peasant Organization in Village T, CNCAS credit covered 76.9% (386,296
F CFA) of the total farming expenses for rice and 86.8% (262,932 F CFA) for 
tomato in 2009/10 (Table 2). Because the credit is so essential, members of the
Peasant Organization must maintain a high repayment rate and retain access to
credit through various collective efforts (Takahashi, 2009: 7–10).
II. Farming Expenses of Rice and Tomato
Clearly, members of a peasant organization must ensure consistent repayment 
to maintain access to credit. This section explores farmland utilization for tomato
cropping, specifi cally with regard to farming expenses under the credit system.
Of all farming expenses, input goods such as seeds, fertilizer, and  agrichemicals
are always most costly (Table 2); in Village T these accounted for 29.8% (149,666
F CFA) of the rice farming expenses and 35.6% (107,793 F CFA) of the tomato
farming expenses. To reduce total input cost, peasants have no alternative but to
cut the cost of fertilizers and agrichemicals because it is extremely diffi cult to cut 
other input costs. They continue to spend equivalent amounts on other input goods
because they believe that reducing input goods will decrease the harvest yield.
In Village T, arrears in rice farming expenses, which was the second-greatest 
tomato farming expense (28.9%), were attributable to the rice production in the
dry season of 2008/09 and the rainy season of 2009/10. Although the Peasant 
Organization harvested 77.9% of the paddy rice necessary to repay their debt in
2008/09, it was unable to sell this paddy rice to private merchants. During the
rice-cropping season of 2009/10, the Peasant Organization requested that  members
repay their debt to the organization in cash rather than paddy rice because the
Peasant Organization already had a vast stock of unsellable paddy rice in  storage.
The members were only able to repay 63.0% of the total debt to the Peasant 
Organization in cash. This was due in part to the poor harvest in 2009/10. In
addition, the members were unable to sell the paddy rice to private merchants
because paddy rice was not yet in high demand in the domestic rice market. The
two rice-cropping seasons before the tomato-cropping season in 2009/10 resulted 
in massive arrears to the Peasant Organization: 13,723,109 F CFA.
Consequently, in 2009/10 the Peasant Organization decided to limit its tomato
cropping acreage covered by CNCAS credit in order to reduce its collective credit.
The Peasant Organization entered into an agreement with SOCAS to sell  tomatoes
cultivated on 30 ha (0.2 ha per member)(12).
This decision resulted in a dilemma: although members of the Peasant Orga-
nization collectively needed to produce more tomatoes and earn enough to repay
the full debt, they were obliged to cultivate tomatoes on very little acreage. Unfor-
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tunately, the villagers were very unlikely to be able to use their own money to
add to their allotted 0.2 ha for tomato cropping in the sandy-plain farmland due
to the limited total acreage of the sandy-plain farmland and the limited number 
of diesel lifting pumps. Therefore, the Peasant Organization could not expect to
discharge its liabilities and acquire credit in the coming seasons from CNCAS,
which bases its approval of credit on past repayment rates. Within this context,
almost half the members of the Peasant Organization decided to plant tomatoes
in the western fl oodplain farmland. Tomato production in fl oodplain farmland 
 produces better harvests and more income than does tomato production in the
sandy-plain farmland due to the superior soil fertility and water retention.
As a result, tomato cropping in 2009/10 resulted in a total gross income of 
36,079,973 F CFA to the Peasant Organization. The Peasant Organization needed 
to repay a total debt of 34,705,885 F CFA from tomato production and the arrears
from the past two rice-cropping seasons. Therefore, on average, members received 
little gross income from the tomato cropping in 2009/10 (Table 2)(13). As shown
in Table 2, the defi cit from the last rice cropping in 2009/10 meant that the
massive arrears took a great portion of members’ total expenses and reduced their 
earning power.
However, it would be more accurate to say that they dipped into the benefi t 
from tomato production to cover the defi cits related to rice production. This is
because they cultivated rice in the dry season of 2009/10 despite the huge  defi cit 
from the rainy season of 2009/10 and the reduced earning power in the tomato-
cropping season. If they simply regarded rice as a gainful crop, their cropping
calendar would appear unreasonable because reliance on rice production alone
increases the risk of using the profi ts from tomato production under conditions
of an unstable and uncertain domestic rice market. However, the members culti-
vated rice twice in 2009/10 despite the rice price collapse because they did not 
plan to cultivate rice in 2010/11 and wanted to secure a whole year’s worth of 
rice for their own consumption.
Additionally, considerable evidence demonstrates that tomato production benefi ted 
the village by covering the defi cits related to rice cropping; the vil1lagers could 
sell harvested tomatoes more reliably than they could sell the harvested rice.
As discussed above, the peasants need contracts with SOCAS to sell tomatoes.
However, the villagers were able to increase their tomato-cropping acreage using
their personal funds because SOCAS actually purchased all harvested tomatoes,
with or without a contract. During the tomato-harvest period, cargo trucks came
to the tomato fi elds and automatically conveyed cases of tomatoes to the SOCAS
factory. Moreover, the villagers were able to sell tomatoes at a fi xed price that 
had been set in the purchase contract: in 2009/10, the price was 51.5 F CFA per 
kilogram. They did not have to fi nd private merchants, research tomato prices,
bargain with merchants over prices, or worry about the risk of tomato-price
collapse. Therefore, peasants were able to anticipate more steady and secure
income from tomato production than from rice production.
The most likely explanation for their cropping strategy is that they grow rice
for their own consumption and tomatoes as a reliable source of profi t. In other 
words, tomato production allows them to cover the defi cit associated with rice
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production when they are unable to sell the rice or have a poor harvest, and 
therefore ensures future credit. From this perspective, it makes sense that mem-
bers chose to plant tomatoes rather than rice in the eastern fl oodplain farmland 
in 2008/09 despite the increased price of paddy rice (Table 1).
The villagers also began larger-scale cultivation of a variety of vegetables that 
they had grown along the canals on a smaller scale during tomato cultivation.
They expanded the crop acreage for these vegetables in expectation of increased 
cash income. In 2009/10, they cultivated 5 ha of onion, 2 ha of  zucchini, 1 ha
of solanaceous crop (Solanum aethiopicum)(14), and other  vegetables. It was not 
easy for them to expand crop acreage and increase their income because they did 
not receive CNCAS credit for these vegetable crops.
The villagers were careful to research the price of various vegetable crops. For 
example, many villagers grew onion because the government keeps the producer 
price for onions stable through import control. They also grew zucchini and a
solanaceous crop in 2009/10 because the producer price for these crops rose
signifi cantly in 2008/09. However, because so many peasants in other villages in
the Lower Senegal River also cultivated these crops in response to the high
2008/09 prices, the producer price for zucchini and a solanaceous crop declined 
in 2009/10. To put in the other way round, peasants in villages other than  Village
T were clearly also attempting to cultivate more profi table vegetables.
Additionally, some villagers in Village T began to mainly cultivate a  solanaceous
crop in sandy-plain farmland immediately after the tomato harvest. They made
this choice because, owing to the canal expansion in 2004, the sandy-plain farm-
land in Village T can be irrigated to cultivate a solanaceous crop in the dry
season, unlike sandy-plain farmland in other villages in the Lower Senegal River 
Valley. Therefore, they expected that production of solanaceous crops would be
reduced, and consequently, the producer price would rise during this period. In
conjunction with the fact that they knew they could earn little cash from tomato
production in 2009/10, they decided to try to earn money on cash crops by
exploring various farmland applications. Currently, villagers in Village T concen-
trate on tomato cultivation, or more precisely, on vegetable cultivation, based on
tomato cultivation for which they can access CNCAS credit.
CONCLUSIONS
The GOANA and PNAR programs and the increased price of rice resulted in
the 2008 farmland exploitation and cultivation-rights allotment project, in which
the Peasant Organization of Village T played a central role. The Peasant Organi-
zation easily obtained a loan from CNCAS to exploit the western fl oodplain
because one mandate of the GOANA and PNAR programs was to expand the
acreage of rice-paddy fi elds. The loan allowed the Peasant Organization to create
new farmland and to grant new cultivation rights for rice production. In addition,
the increased price of rice led some villagers to re-utilize abandoned farmland.
These projects allowed the villagers to generate income-producing opportunities
and strengthen the foundation of their livelihoods.
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The villagers chose not to cultivate rice in the eastern farmland in 2008/09
when the producer price of paddy rice increased sharply, but instead cultivated 
rice in 2009/10 when the producer price dropped. The analysis of their cropping
strategies in 2008/09 and 2009/10 revealed that the villagers tended to favor 
tomato cultivation in the fl oodplain. These cropping strategies indicate that they
viewed rice as a subsistence crop rather than a main cash crop and that they saw
tomato as a main cash crop because they could turn a profi t on tomato  production
more reliably than on rice production. In addition, they could use the profi t from
tomato production to cover the defi cit from previous rice crops. This strategy
ensured they could cover a rice production defi cit in case they were unable to
sell the rice crop or had a poor harvest, and they could therefore ensure the
continuation of their future credit, as exemplifi ed by the tomato cropping in
2009/10.
Kofi  Annan, Chairman of the Board of the Alliance for Green Revolution in
Africa (AGRA), said in his opening remarks at the second CARD general
meeting, “When Africa’s farmers are given the chance ... they are eager to take
advantage of the opportunity and they can produce remarkable results” (Annan,
2009). Reducing dependence on rice import and achieving national food  security
will certainly require supportive measures that can lead to the creation of oppor-
tunities for rice production, e.g., improving rice production through irrigation
systems, ensuring a stable supply of input goods, stabilizing producer prices, and 
providing agricultural credit.
However, this view is quite unsatisfactory. In fact, this  empirical analysis of 
farmland utilization and cropping strategies in Village T revealed that fi rst,  African
peasants do not always cultivate rice when they are given the chance, and  second,
African peasants are not always just waiting to be ‘given the chance.’
The data from this study do not indicate that peasants in the Senegal River 
Valley would plant rice, even if the Senegalese government or international aid 
agencies promote land for rice cultivation and expand rice-paddy acreage.  Villagers
might choose not to plant rice due to some unfavorable conditions such as
turbulence in the rice market, instead choosing to plant other crops that enjoy
better market conditions. They realize that rice cropping is just one cropping
option, although they are unlikely to abandon rice cropping entirely because rice
is their dietary staple and essential to ensure their own food security.
By the same token, the villagers in Village T were not passively waiting to be
‘given a chance,’ as is the common assumption about African peasants. This case
study has shown that these villagers had planned several alternatives and applied 
these options under specifi c political, economic, or social conditions. While the
peasants in Village T developed rice-paddy fi elds after the price of paddy rice
increased sharply, they sought out new effective opportunities for increased earnings
after the collapse in paddy-rice prices, such as tomato, onion, and other vegetable
crops. These broadened cropping options were made possible through their own
exploitation and re-utilization of farmland and their own expansion of canals. By
enabling several cropping options, they can both ensure their own food security
and increase their cash-earning ability.
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NOTES
(1) For example, a dish of stewed rice and fi sh with consommé soup, called “ceeb jén” (cε:b
jen in Wolof; literally stewed rice [ceeb] and fi sh [jén]), is now regarded as the national
cuisine of Senegal (Cusack, 2003).
(2) Le franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (F CFA) used to be pegged to the
French franc at the exchange rate of 100 F CFA per French franc, and is now pegged to
the euro at the exchange rate of 655.957 F CFA per euro. One dollar is equivalent to
480.2 F CFA at the exchange rate in November 2010.
(3) The Senegalese government implemented the GOANA program as the annual agricultural
program of 2008/09. The government continued to implement “GOANA II” for 2009/10
and “GOANA III” for 2010/11.
(4) The sharp increase in international rice prices did not refl ect the PNAR program
(implemented in October 2006), but it evidently allowed the government to revise and 
re-implement the PNAR program in December 2007.
(5) Whereas the price of rice in Senegal’s domestic market and the global market remain
higher than the average price in 2007, prices of rice produced in the Lower Senegal River 
Valley fell below the average price prior to the increase in rice prices. This trend, which
differed from other trends in domestic and global markets, is an important subject that 
requires careful analysis, but it lies beyond the scope of this paper.
(6) Growing food insecurity in African countries today is attracting the attention of the
international community (cf. FAO, 2009a). For example, the Coalition for African Rice
Development (CARD) Initiative, proposed by the Japan International Cooperation
Agency (JICA) and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2008, has
established partnerships with many agencies including the Food and Agriculture
Organization, the World Bank, the Africa Rice Center, and others (JICA & AGRA,
2008).
(7) At the time of my research, the members of Village T included 115 male heads of 
household, four female heads, 15 male and one female non-household heads, and 29
male and two female non-residents.
(8) The executive committee of the Peasant Organization of Village T is composed of a
president, vice-president, secretary general, treasurer, treasurer for credit, secretary, and 
a credit and farmland improvement management representative. They are elected by the
members and work on a volunteer basis. They work mainly to manage the treasury funds
from CNCAS to the Peasant Organization, manage farmland, control irrigation water,
and serve as a contact point for international aid agencies.
(9) This innovative idea of the villagers to irrigate vegetable fi elds was the fi rst trial of its
kind in the Senegal River Valley; communities in other areas are now applying this
model and are working to expand their canal network by tunneling under the paved 
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road.
(10) The agricultural calendar in Senegal runs from July to June.
(11) However, peasants who harvest tomatoes under contract are not required to sell all
tomatoes to SOCAS. They may also sell tomatoes to other private merchants, but they
are more likely to sell to SOCAS than to private merchants.
(12) Before 2009/10, they cultivated tomatoes on 30.8–81.2 ha.
(13) Some villagers made a profi t on tomato production in 2009/10; their profi ts compensated 
for the shortfall of other villagers’ repayments. This aspect of compensation for repayment 
shortfall is an interesting subject. I have discussed credit repayment for rice in a previous
paper (Takahashi, 2009), but it lies beyond the scope of this paper, and I will explore it 
in a later work. Although the villagers were unable to make a profi t after the tomato
harvest, they optimistically hope to get money someday.
(14) Solanum aethiopicum, a species of solanaceae, called “xuluňe” (xuluɲe) in Wolof in  St.
Louis region, “jaxatu” (jaxatu) in Wolof or “aubergine amère (bitter eggplant)” in French
in Senegal, is grown throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and South America.
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